| |  | | | | | |
| |
|
| Summit meeting 1979 – SALT II
treaty |
|
 |
|
|
18 June 1979
In the Wiener Hofburg, U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the Soviet state
and party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev sign the SALT-II-treaty (Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks) – the restriction of the strategic arsenals to
2250 launcher systems each, which 1200 buzz bombs with multiple warheads. |
|
|
 |
|
|
|
| Although the first SALT-treaty should
have been valid until 1977, the two Great Powers had already
initiated talks in 1974 about further steps towards disarmament.
These resulted in the so-called Vladivostok-Agreement of the year
1974. This new treaty established equally on both sides a
quantitative upper limit on the means of delivery for missile
launcher systems. This new draft formed the foundation of the SALT
II-Treaty which was not signed until 1979, after more than six years
of continuous negotiations. In this status it was introduced and
analysed, although even with the joint signatures of the two heads
of state Carter and Brezhnev it was never ratified. Indeed, the
American Committee on Foreign Relations approved the treaty, but
President Carter himself later advised the Committee to reject it,
after the Soviet Union marched into Afghanistan and when America
felt certain of their perception of the global threat of communism.
But because the treaty was already signed, both parties were bound
to it according to international law insofar as they were not
allowed to contravene the provisions of the treaty without
officially declaring its non-implementation. Furthermore, both
administrations issued a statement of their intent to respect the
treaty despite its non-ratification. |
|
| Pictures: International press-picture
agency Votava |
|
|
TREATY BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON
THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
In accordance with Article VII of the Interim Agreement, in which the
sides committed themselves to continue active negotiations on strategic
offensive arms, the SALT II negotiations began in November 1972. The
primary goal of SALT II was to replace the Interim Agreement with a
long-term comprehensive Treaty providing broad limits on strategic
offensive weapons systems. The principal U.S. objectives as the SALT II
negotiations began were to provide for equal numbers of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles for the sides, to begin the process of
reduction of these delivery vehicles, and to impose restraints on
qualitative developments which could threaten future stability.
Early discussion between the sides focused on the weapon systems to be
included, factors involved in providing for equality in numbers of
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, taking into account the important
differences between the forces of the two sides, bans on new systems,
qualitative limits, and a Soviet proposal to include U.S. forward-based
systems. The positions of the sides differed widely on many of these
issues.
A major breakthrough occurred at the Vladivostok meeting in November
1974, between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev. At this
meeting, the sides agreed to a basic framework for the SALT II agreement.
Basic elements of the Aide-Memoire, which recorded this agreement,
included:
-- 2,400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers) of the sides;
-- 1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV systems;
-- ban on construction of new land-based ICBM launchers;
-- limits on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms; and
-- important elements of the Interim Agreement (e.g., relating to
verification) would be incorporated in the new agreement.
In addition, the Aide-Memoire stated that the duration of the new
agreement would be through 1985.
In early 1975, the delegations in Geneva resumed negotiations, working
toward an agreement based on this general framework. It was during this
time that a Joint Draft Text was first prepared and many limitations
were agreed. During the negotiations, however, it became clear that
there was fundamental disagreement between the two sides on two major
issues: how cruise missiles were to be addressed, and whether the new
Soviet bomber known to the United States as Backfire would be considered
a heavy bomber and therefore counted in the 2,400 aggregate. While there
was disagreement on other issues such as MIRV verification provisions,
restrictions on new systems, and missile throw-weight ceilings, progress
was made in these areas. However, the issues of cruise missiles and
Backfire remained unresolved.
When the new Administration took office in 1977, renewed emphasis was
placed on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A comprehensive
interagency review of SALT was undertaken. Building on the work of the
previous Administra-tion, particularly the Vladivostok accord and the
subsequent agreement on many issues in Geneva, the United States made a
comprehen-sive proposal which was presented to the Soviets by Secretary
of State Vance in March 1977. This proposal would have added significant
reductions and qualitative constraints to the ceilings which were agreed
to at Vladivostok. At the same time, the United States also presented an
alternative proposal for a SALT II agreement similar to the framework
agreed to at Vladivostok, with the Backfire and cruise missile issues
deferred until SALT III.
Both proposals were rejected by the Soviets as inconsistent with their
understandings of the Vladivostok accord.
In subsequent negotiations, the sides agreed on a general framework for
SALT II which accommodated both the Soviet desire to retain the
Vladivostok framework for an agreement, and the U.S. desire for more
comprehensive limitations in SALT II.
The agreement would consist of three parts:
-- A Treaty which would be in force through 1985 based on the
Vladivostok accord;
-- A Protocol of about three-years duration which would cover certain
issues such as cruise missile constraints, mobile ICBM limits, and
qualitative constraints on ICBMs, while deferring further negotiations
on these issues to SALT III;
-- A Joint Statement of Principles which would be an agreed set of
guidelines for future negotiations.
Within this framework, negotiations to resolve the remaining differences
continued on several levels. President Carter, Secretary Vance, and
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Washington in September 1977.
Further high-level meetings were held in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva
during 1978 and 1979. In addition, the SALT delegations of the United
States and Soviet Union in Geneva were in session nearly continuously
following the 1974 Vladivostok meeting to work out agreed Treaty
language on those issues where agreement in principle had been reached
at the ministerial level.
The completed SALT II agreement was signed by President Carter and
General Secretary Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. President Carter
transmitted it to the Senate on June 22 for its advice and consent to
ratification.
On January 3, 1980, however, President Carter requested the Senate
majority leader to delay consideration of the Treaty on the Senate floor
in view of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although the Treaty
remained unratified, each Party was individually bound under the terms
of international law to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of the Treaty, until it had made its intentions clear not to
become a party to the Treaty.
In 1980, President Carter announced the United States would comply with
the provisions of the Treaty as long as the Soviet Union reciprocated.
Brezhnev made a similar statement regarding Soviet intentions.
In May 1982, President Reagan stated he would do nothing to undercut the
SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union showed equal restraint. The
Soviet Union again agreed to abide by the unratified Treaty.
Subsequently, in 1984 and 1985, President Reagan declared that the
Soviet Union had violated its political commitment to observe the SALT
II Treaty. President Reagan decided, however, that an interim framework
of mutual restraint remained in the U.S. interest and, in June 1985,
declared that the United States would continue to refrain from
undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the
Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet
Union actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and
Space Talks in Geneva.
On May 26, 1986, President Reagan stated that he had reviewed again the
status of U.S. interim restraint policy and that, as he had documented
in three detailed reports to the Congress, the Soviet Union had not
complied with its political commitment to observe the SALT agreements,
including the SALT II Treaty, nor had the Soviet Union indicated its
readiness to join in a framework of truly mutual restraint. He declared
that, "Given this situation, ... in the future, the United States must
base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and
magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on
standards contained in the SALT structure...." In his statement,
President Reagan said that he did not anticipate any appreciable
numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces and that, assuming
no significant change in the threat, the United States would not deploy
more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile
warheads than the Soviets. The United States would, in sum, "...continue
to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence,
in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant
reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides." He again called
upon the Soviet Union to join the United States "...in establishing an
interim framework of truly mutual restraint."
The SALT II Treaty would have provided for:
-- an equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles -- ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface
ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Initially, this ceiling would have been
2,400 as agreed at Vladivostok. The ceiling would have been lowered to
2,250 at the end of 1981;
-- an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of launchers of
MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise
missiles;
-- an equal aggregate limit of 1,200 on the total number of launchers of
MIRVed ballistic missiles; and
-- an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.
In addition to these numerical limits, the agreement would have
included:
-- a ban on construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, and on
increases in the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers;
-- a ban on heavy mobile ICBM launchers, and on launchers of heavy
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and air-to-surface
ballistic missiles (ASBMs);
-- a ban on flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an
exception of one new type of light ICBM for each side;
-- a ban on increasing the numbers of warheads on existing types of
ICBMs, and a limit of 10 warheads on the one new type of ICBM permitted
to each Party, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs, and 10 warheads on
ASBMs. The number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber would
have been limited to an average of 28; and the number of long-range
cruise missiles per heavy bomber of existing types would have been
limited to 20;
-- ceilings on the launch-weight and throw-weight of strategic ballistic
missiles and a ban on the conversion of light ICBM launchers to
launchers of heavy ICBMs;
-- a ban on the Soviet SS-16 ICBM;
-- a ban on rapid reload ICBM systems;
-- a ban on certain new types of strategic offensive systems which were
technologically feasible, but which had not yet been deployed. Such
systems included long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships, and
ballistic and cruise missile launchers on the seabeds;
-- advance notification of certain ICBM test launches; and
-- an agreed data base for systems included in various SALT-limited
categories.
The Treaty also included detailed definitions of limited systems,
provisions to enhance verification, a ban on circumvention of the
provisions of the agreement, and a provision outlining the duties of the
SCC in connection with the SALT II Treaty. The duration of the Treaty
was to have been through 1985.
Verification of the SALT II Treaty would have been by national technical
means (NTM) of verification, including photo-reconnaissance satellites.
The sides had agreed not to interfere with each others national
technical means of verification, and not to use deliberate concealment
measures which would have impeded verification by NTM of compliance with
the provisions of the agreement. Because specific characteristics of
some SALT-limited systems become apparent during the testing phase,
monitoring of testing programs was an important aspect of SALT
verification. Such monitoring might have involved collection of
electronic signals known as telemetry which are used during tests to
transmit information about systems while they are being tested.
Therefore, the sides had agreed not to engage in deliberate denial of
telemetric information such as through the use of telemetry encryption
whenever such denial would have impeded verification of compliance with
the provisions of the Treaty.
In addition to these provisions of the Treaty which directly addressed
the question of verification, counting and distinguishability rules, as
well as some constraints on specific systems, were incorporated into the
agreement specifically for verification purposes.
To facilitate verification of the MIRV limits, the sides agreed that
once a missile had been tested with MIRVs, then all missiles of that
type were to be considered to have been equipped with MIRVs, even if
that missile type had also been tested with a non-MIRV payload.
Additionally, the sides agreed that once a launcher contained or
launched a MIRVed missile, then all launchers of that type would be
considered to be launchers of MIRVed missiles and included in the 1,320
limit. Similar counting rules were adopted for cruise missiles and for
heavy bombers.
A constraint included for verification purposes was a ban on production,
testing, and deployment of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM. The missile appeared
to share a number of components with the Soviet SS-20, an intermediate
range ballistic missile (IRBM). As the Parties had agreed that
land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs should
not be converted into launchers of ICBMs, the United States sought this
ban on the SS-16 in order to prevent verification problems which might
have arisen if the SS-16 program had gone forward, since in that case
distinguishing between SS-16 and SS-20 deployments would have been very
difficult.
Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, the sides exchanged data on
the numbers of weapons in SALT-limited categories, and agreed to
maintain this agreed data base through regular updates at each session
of the Standing Consultative Commission. Although the United States did
not require (and did not rely upon) this data for verification purposes,
maintenance of the agreed data base would have insured that both parties
applied the provisions of the Treaty in a consistent manner.
The protocol to the Treaty was to have remained in force until December
31, 1981. In the protocol the sides agreed to ban deployment of mobile
ICBM launchers and flight-testing of ICBMs from such launchers.
Development of such systems short of flight-testing would have been
permitted. (After the protocol period, the Treaty specifically permitted
the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers.)
Additionally, the protocol banned deployment, but not testing, of cruise
missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 kilometers on ground- and
sea-based launchers. (The protocol would not have limited deployment of
such systems after its expiration in 1981.)
Finally, the protocol included a ban on flight testing and deployment of
ASBMs.
The Joint Statement of Principles, the third element of the SALT II
agreement, would have established a basic framework for the next stage
of SALT negotiations, SALT III. The sides agreed on the following
general goals to be achieved in the next round of talks:
-- significant and substantial reductions in the number of strategic
offensive arms; -- further qualitative limitations on strategic
offensive arms; and -- resolution of the issues included in the
protocol.
The sides would also have considered other steps to enhance strategic
stability, and either side could have brought up any other topic
relevant to the limitation of strategic arms.
The Joint Statement of Principles also established the principle that
cooperative measures might be used to ensure adequate verification of a
SALT III agreement, raising the possibility of thus going beyond
reliance on national technical means of verification alone. |
| |
| |
|
|
|
 |
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
Internet Portal
Betriebsges.m.b.H.
Praterstrasse 33/20
A-1020 Vienna
Tel: +43/01/9580808
Fax: +43/01/9580909
E-Mail: office@citype.com
www.citype.com
FN 200659 m
ATU 50515900 |
 |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
WIEN-VIENNA.AT associates itself
with a liberal, tolerant, cosmopolitan, ecumenical and politically
neutral world view.
Diversity of information and the support of free formation of
opinion for people of every age, every social levels, cultures,
denominations and political orientations are matters of concern for
us.
WIEN-VIENNA.AT is a link and information platform with the aim to
inform about Vienna while at the same time creating a collection of
links from official and private Vienna-related internet pages. We
strive to maximise the density of the presented information about
Vienna. In part, contents of this link and information platform
originate from websites about Vienna. Images and texts where the
author is known are provided with an acknowledgement and a link to
the respective site. In case of breached property rights with
certain images, we kindly ask you to notify us and we will remove
the respective images or excerpts from the platform or we will add
an appropriate acknowledgement of ownership.
 |
|
|
|
| |
|
